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LITIGATION-ENDING SANCTIONS: ALASKA
COURTS' USE OF RULE 37
I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that the "rules shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding."' The goals of Rule 1 provide an impor-
tant framework for examining other procedural rules, and it is within
this framework that the entire rules system should be applied. Recog-
nizing the relationship between this framework and the rules system is
particularly important when applying the rules governing discovery.
Discovery practices and procedures, because they occur in the initial
stages of litigation and involve direct interaction between the parties
with little or no judicial supervision, may determine the character of
the succeeding stages of litigation.2 The discovery process has a tangi-
ble effect upon each of the goals of Rule 1, and its use or abuse can be
a significant factor in determining whether the judicial process renders
a decision that is fair, prompt, and based on the merits.
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 37,3 which is substantially the
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1. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 1.
2. The federal and Alaska discovery rules generally contemplate limited judicial
intervention in the discovery process and depend on cooperation between opposing
parties. See Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil
Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH 3. 875, 882. Given the minimal amount of judicial supervision, the possibility
of discovery abuse and bickering leading to a polluted pretrial environment is signifi-
cant. Uncooperative behavior in the discovery process often results in an incomplete,
prolonged, and expensive litigation process. See id. at 881.
3. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 37 provides:
Rule 37. Failure to Make Discovery: Sanctions.
(a) Motion for Order Compelling Discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for
an order compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate Court. An application for an order to a party may
be made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters
relating to a deposition, to the court in the judicial district where
the deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a
deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the judi-
cial district where the deposition is being taken.
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(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded
or submitted under Rules 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity
fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party
fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a
party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule
34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as requested
or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party
may move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or
an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request.
When taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of
the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he
applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make
such protective order as it would have been empowered to make on
a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or Incomplete Answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to
answer.
(4) Award of Expenses of Motion. If the motion is granted, the
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or de-
ponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or at-
torney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving
party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, in-
cluding attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to
the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for
hearing, require the moving party or the attorney advising the mo-
tion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed
the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the mo-
tion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the mak-
ing of the motion was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court
may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the
motion among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to Comply With Order.
(1) Sanctions by Court in Judicial District Where Deposition is
Taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question
after being directed to do so by the court in the judicial district in
which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered
a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person desig-
nated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an
order made under subdivision (a) of this or Rule 35, the court in
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was
made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be estab-
lished for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to sup-
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port or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting
him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or stay-
ing further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dis-
missing the action or proceedings or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to
obey any orders except an order to submit to physical or
mental examination;
(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under
Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination,
such orders as are listed in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of
this subdivision, unless the party failing to comply shows that
he is unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the
order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reason-
able expenses including the attorney's fees, caused by the fail-
ure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of ex-
penses unjust.
(c) Expenses on Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit the genuine-
ness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under
Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the
genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to
the court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the reason-
able expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the
request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admis-
sion sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to
admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the
matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition or Serve Answers to
Interrogatories or Respond to Request for Inspection. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to
appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served
with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interroga-
tories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogato-
ries, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection
submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the court
in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any ac-
tion authorized under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of sudivision (b)(2)
of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified
or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused
on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the
party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by
Rule 26(c).
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same as its federal counterpart,4 was enacted to ensure adherence to
the discovery process. The rule authorizes the court to issue orders
compelling discovery5 and to impose sanctions for a failure to comply
with such orders.6 The sanctions available to the court range from the
assessment of costs resulting from the noncompliance to the imposi-
tion of a default judgment.7 This note will examine the implementa-
tion of Rule 37 litigation-ending sanctions, 8 initially focusing on the
development of their use in the federal system. Particular attention
will be given to the degree of culpability which should be required
before such sanctions are imposed. After considering some of the al-
ternative culpability standards, this note will examine the Alaska
courts' experience with these sanctions. The relevant Alaska cases will
be analyzed and suggestions will be offered concerning the future im-
position of Rule 37 litigation-ending sanctions by the Alaska courts.
II. RULE 37 AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULPABILITY
STANDARDS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Background
The discovery provisions of both the Alaska and Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are found in Rules 26 through 37. Rule 26 establishes
the permissible scope of the discovery process. It provides that discov-
ery may be obtained of any unprivileged information relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action. 9 The broad scope of
this rule was intended to assist the courts in reaching the merits of
legal disputes by a process more conducive to the pursuit of truth than
that envisioned by the "sporting theory" of justice. 10
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 is almost identical to the Alaska rule, but includes an
additional section, 37(g), which provides for the assessment of expenses against a
party or its attorney that fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan by agreement as required by FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
5. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 37(a).
6. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 37(b).
7. Id.
8. Litigation-ending sanctions include those that have the effect of terminating
the litigation after a less than full adjudication on the merits. The emphasis in this
definition is on the effective termination of the action without an adjudication of the
significant issues in the case. For example, the sanction of default is clearly a
litigation-ending sanction because the case is never tried on its merits. In contrast, the
exclusion of certain evidence may or may not rise to the level of a litigation-ending
sanction, depending on the nature of the issue to which the evidence relates.
9. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Werner, Survey of Discovery Sanctions, 1979
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 301 ("In rejecting the 'sporting theory' of justice, the federal dis-
covery rules contravened the adversary notion previously embedded in our legal
system.").
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The discovery process has three primary functions:
(1) To narrow the issues, in order that at trial it may be necessary
to produce evidence only on a residue of matters that are found to
be actually disputed or controverted.
(2) To obtain evidence for use at the trial.
(3) To secure information about the existence of evidence that
may be used at the trial and to ascertain how and from whom it
may be procured. .... 11
Consistent with the predominant goals of the rules, the discovery pro-
cess is directed toward full and open disclosure of relevant informa-
tion. Accordingly, an exchange of less than the desirable amount of
information results in a frustration of discovery. Such an outcome is
reminiscent of the sporting theory of justice and results in significantly
less emphasis on the merits of a dispute than was envisioned by the
proponents of the procedural rules.12
The general purpose of Rule 37 sanctions is "to effectuate the
discovery process."' 3 More specifically, as recognized by the Second
Circuit, discovery sanctions serve a threefold purpose: "[to] ensure
that a party will not be able to profit from its own failure to comply
[with discovery;] . . . to secure compliance with the particular order
at hand[;] . . . [and to act as a] general deterrent. . . on the instant
case and on other litigation."'14 These purposes indicate that sanctions
are expected to play a significant, even determinative, role in litigation
if the discovery process is abused.
Rule 37 is the primary source of sanctions for abuse of the discov-
ery process. 15 Under Rule 37(a), an aggrieved party seeking discovery
may move for an order to compel discovery. 16 If the order is granted
11. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001
(1970).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee note.
13. Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d 143, 147 (Alaska 1971).
14. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Sumitomo
Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980).
15. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 264,
267 (1979). Rule 37 is not the exclusive source of authority for imposing discovery
sanctions in the federal system. Federal courts have inherent power to impose sanc-
tions for abuse of the judicial process and are authorized by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(1982), to assess costs against attorneys who unreasonably multiply the proceedings.
Renfrew, supra, at 268-69.
16. This note is concerned with the sanctioning process under Rule 37(b). The
sanctions authorized by this subsection may not be imposed unless a court order to
permit or provide discovery has been violated. The sanctions provided by Rule 37(c)
and (d) may be invoked in the absence of a violated court order. Rule 37(c) provides
for the assessment of expenses against a party that fails to admit the genuineness of
any document or the truth of any matter asserted under Rule 36. Rule 37(d) autho-
rizes the imposition of certain Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions upon motion against a party
that has failed to appear for a deposition, or to serve answers, objections, or responses
to certain interrogatories or requests. If the sanction sought under Rule 37(d) is
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
and the party to whom the order is directed fails to comply, the dis-
covering party may seek relief under Rule 37(b). This subsection con-
tains a wide range of sanctions that may be imposed for
noncompliance with court discovery orders. The rule authorizes the
court to: require the noncomplying party or its attorney, or both, to
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the
innocent party as a result of the failure to obey the order;17 strike out a
portion of the pleadings;18 establish designated facts; 19 preclude the
admission of designated matters in evidence;20 deny the opportunity to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses; 21 treat the failure to
comply as contempt of court;22 dismiss all or part of the action or
render a default judgment;23 or make any other order that is just.24
Once the court determines that a party has failed to comply with a
discovery order, the selection and imposition of a sanction is within
the discretion of the trial court.25
Litigation-ending sanctions include establishment-preclusion
orders, 26 dismissal orders, and default judgments. Dismissal orders
and default judgments terminate an action outright.27 Establishment-
preclusion orders can establish or preclude a party from establishing a
particular claim or defense that goes to a central issue in the case, an
action that, for all practical purposes, determines the outcome of the
litigation.28 Most of the discussion of the application of Rule 37 has
centered on the circumstances and behavior that warrant the imposi-
tion of these litigation-ending sanctions. Much of this discussion re-
sponds to the tension inherent in a procedural system that places great
emphasis on a full adjudication on the merits, yet provides discovery
litigation-ending, it is subject to the same constraints as those sanctions available
under Rule 37(b).
17. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
18. Id. at 37(b)(2)(C).
19. Id. at 37(b)(2)(A).
20. Id. at 37(b)(2)(B).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 37(b)(2)(D) ("except an order to submit to physical or mental
examination").
23. Id. at 37(b)(2)(C).
24. Id. at 37(b)(2).
25. See Hawes Firearms Co. v. Edwards, 634 P.2d 377, 378 (Alaska 1981) (quot-
ing Oaks v. Rojcewicz, 409 P.2d 839, 844 (Alaska 1966)); see also 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 11, § 2284.
26. See generally Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d at 146-47 (court
reversed an establishment-preclusion order going to a central issue in the case).
27. Default judgments result in a disposition favorable to the plaintiff. Dismissals
have the effect of terminating the plaintiff's action.
28. See generally Hawes Firearms Co., 634 P.2d at 378 (defendant's defenses were
stricken pursuant to Rule 37 and trial was conducted as to damages only).
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mechanisms that permit courts to dispose of cases without considering
the merits.29
B. Due Process Limitations on the Imposition of Sanctions
Constitutional limitations on the imposition of litigation-ending
sanctions militate against the liberal application of the harshest Rule
37 sanctions. The due process clause of the fifth amendment, as ap-
plied to the states by incorporation in the fourteenth amendment, gov-
erns much of the sanctioning process. The general boundaries 30 of the
due process limitations and the principles underlying the application
of Rule 37 are outlined in four United States Supreme Court opinions,
two of which were decided before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were enacted.
In Hovey v. Elliot, the Supreme Court addressed the issue whether
a court possessed discretionary power to impose sanctions when a
party refused to obey a court order to deposit money with the court.31
The Court refused to uphold the lower court's sanctions - striking
the delinquent party's answers-and entering a decreepro confesso. The
Court held that the complete denial of an opportunity for a trial on the
merits and the rendering of a decree without a hearing violated the
party's due process rights and was an unconstitutional response to
contempt. 32
Twelve years later, in Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,33 the
Court affirmed a default judgment entered after the defendant had
failed to comply with a court order to produce specified witnesses and
documents. The Court approved the trial court's use of a presumption
that "the refusal to produce evidence material to the administration of
due process was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted
defense."'34 Noting that all that was required of the defendant was a
bona fide effort to comply with the order, the Court stated that any
29. See generally Werner, supra note 10, at 301-02 (In addition to the tension
between the "reach-the-merits" philosophy and the use of sanctions to enforce discov-
ery procedures, the author identifies the tension inherent in a system that seeks mutual
disclosure while maintaining its strong adversarial nature.).
30. The precise constitutional limits on a court's power to impose litigation-
ending sanctions have not been defined by the United States Supreme Court. See 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 11, § 2283; see also infra text accompanying notes
36-47.
31. Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
32. Id. at 444-46. The plaintiffs in the action had obtained the decree in an earlier
trial and argued that the decree was binding upon the defendants in separate proceed-
ings. The case came to the United States Supreme Court after the New York Court of
Appeals held that the judgment was beyond the jurisdiction of the rendering court.
Id. at 412-13. The Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 446-47.
33. 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
34. Id. at 351.
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reasonable showing of inability to comply would satisfy its
requirements. 35
The Court in Hammond distinguished the Hovey decision as one
involving "a denial of all right to defend as a mere punishment. '36
The original Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 37 also recog-
nized this distinction between Hovey and Hammond - the difference
"between the justifiable use of [litigation-ending sanctions] as a means
of compelling the production of evidence, and their unjustifiable use,
as in Hovey v. Elliot .. . for the mere purpose of punishing for
contempt."'37
Several years after the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court elaborated upon the Hovey-Hammond distinc-
tion in Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Com-
merciales, S.A. v. Rogers. 38 This case involved a court order requiring
the Swiss plaintiff to produce certain business records. The plaintiff
opposed the order on the ground that under Swiss law the production
of the records would subject the custodian to criminal penalties. The
trial court held that the possibility of criminal sanctions in Switzerland
was not a legitimate basis for refusing to comply with the court order
and granted a motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). 39 The
court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court
declined to base its decision on due process grounds, 40 and stated that
Rule 37(b)(2) should not be interpreted to permit dismissal or default
for failure to comply with an order "when it has been established that
failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad
faith, or any fault of petitioner."'4'
The Court reaffirmed the Societe Internationale decision in Na-
tional Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc. 42 After nu-
merous extensions and promises to comply, the district court
dismissed the plaintiff's antitrust action for failure to answer interroga-
tories as ordered. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal, finding
that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the plain-
35. Id. at 347, 353-54.
36. Id. at 350.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee note.
38. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
39. Id. at 201-02.
40. The Court noted that the Hovey and Hammond decisions did not resolve the
question whether "due process is violated by the striking of a complaint because of a
plaintiffs inability, despite good faith efforts, to comply with a pretrial production
order." Id. at 210. Instead of explicitly considering the "serious constitutional ques-
tions" provoked by such an action, the Court construed Rule 37 in such a manner as
to preclude the use of the harsher sanctions if the inability to comply was in good
faith. Id. at 212.
41. Id. at 212.
42. 427 U.S. 639, 640 (1976).
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tiff's conduct was willful, intentional, or in bad faith.43 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the district court's finding of flagrant bad
faith was supported by the record. The Court explicitly disapproved
of the leniency exhibited by the court of appeals, stating that
the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or
rule must be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not
merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant
such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such
conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.44
The National Hockey League decision signaled a shift in the
Court's approach to failures to comply with discovery orders because
the Court "went beyond the traditional wisdom that parties will com-
ply in the future, given one more chance."'45 The Court stressed the
importance of the deterrent function of Rule 37, a function which up
to that time rarely had been recognized. 46 The Court's approval of the
Societe Internationale principle was clear, but it was also apparent
that, at least in certain situations, the general deterrent effect of harsh
sanctions should take precedence over the "reach the merits" philoso-
phy that had prevailed in Societe Internationale.47
C. Culpability Requirements
The four preceding opinions provide the framework in which
commentators and courts have analyzed the imposition of Rule 37
litigation-ending sanctions. 4s This section will briefly discuss sug-
gested alternatives to the requirements for the use of the sanctions.
The focal point of this discussion is culpability; that is, the degree of
fault in failing to comply with a discovery order that is required to
43. In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litig., 531 F.2d 1188, 1195 (3d Cir.
1976).
44. 427 U.S. at 643.
45. Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Defining a Feasible Culpability
Threshold for the Imposition of Severe Discovery Sanctions, 65 MINN. L. REv. 137, 143
(1980-81).
46. See id. at 149; see also Note, Discovery Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: A Goal-Oriented Mission for Rule 37, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603,
623 (1978-79) (The National Hockey League decision "signifies a subordination of len-
ity in the imposition of sanctions in favor of the theory that noncompliance can be
deterred through the imposition of harsh sanctions."); Note, The Emerging Deterrence
Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Emerging Deterrence].
47. See Werner, supra note 10, at 319.
48. It should be noted that the Hovey and Hammond decisions were decided on
constitutional due process grounds, thereby providing the constitutional boundaries
for the imposition of discovery sanctions. While the Court did consider the due pro-
cess implications of the use of litigation-ending sanctions in Societe Internationale and
National Hockey League, these decisions were based on the Court's interpretation of
Rule 37.
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justify the imposition of sanctions that will effectively terminate an
action with less than a full adjudication on the merits.
The imposition of litigation-ending sanctions under Rule 37(b)
has been analyzed by one commentator under three alternative culpa-
bility thresholds. 49 These thresholds are identified as conventional
intent, gross negligence, and ordinary negligence. The conventional in-
tent threshold is the standard that predominates in the federal courts.
As articulated in both Societe Internationale and National Hockey
League, 50 the standard demands that Rule 37(b) should not be inter-
preted to authorize the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions in the
absence of "wilfulness, bad faith, or any fault of the [noncomplying
party]. ' 51 The emphasis of this approach is on the remedial and com-
pensatory goals of the discovery sanction process: to compensate the
injured party for the noncompliance.5 2 Litigation-ending sanctions
are inconsistent with the remedial goal because they end the litigation
and do not remedy the noncompliance. For this reason courts tradi-
tionally have held that only exceptional circumstances would warrant
termination of an action before an adjudication on the merits.5 3 Of the
three approaches, the conventional intent standard places the greatest
emphasis on reaching the merits of a dispute.
The second threshold, gross negligence, is a product of the Na-
tional Hockey League and Societe Internationale opinions. The stan-
dard calls for the imposition of the harshest sanctions when
noncompliance results from gross negligence. It has been adopted in
two circuits. Relying heavily on National Hockey League, the First
Circuit. in Affanato v. Merrill Brothers,54 affirmed a default judgment
49. See Note, supra note 45, at 141-49.
50. Although the National Hockey League opinion was concerned primarily with
the deterrent effect of sanctions, the Court clearly demonstrated that an integral com-
ponent of the decision was the "flagrant bad faith" and "callous disregard of responsi-
bilities" displayed by the noncomplying party. National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at
643. The behavior of the noncomplying party serves to place the decision squarely
within the confines of Societe Internationale.
51. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 212. The term most often referred to with
respect to the requirement for culpable conduct is "willfulness." Although the precise
meaning of the term cannot be articulated, as its construction is often influenced by its
context, the following definition may be useful to keep in mind:
An act or omission is "willfully" done, if done voluntarily and intentionally
and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the
specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to
say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1434 (5th ed. 1979).
52. See Note, supra note 45, at 141.
53. Id. Under the remedial rationale, the most severe discovery sanctions should
be imposed only when a lesser sanction would not return the parties to equal positions.
See id. at 150.
54. 547 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1977).
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that had been entered because of the defendant's failure to answer in-
terrogatories. The court found that the conduct of the defendant's at-
torney went well beyond ordinary negligence and justified the
imposition of a final default judgment. 55 The court cited the
deterrence objective of Rule 37 and stated that the policy favoring dis-
position of cases on their merits must be weighed against "the time
and energies of our courts and the rights of would-be litigants awaiting
their turns to have other matters resolved."'5 6 The court omitted any
reference to an intent or willfulness requirement.
The most extensive discussion of the gross negligence standard is
found in Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp.,57 in which the court found gross attorney negligence to be
grounds for a preclusion order tantamount to a dismissal. The court
recognized that commentators 58 have generally suggested that willful-
ness or conscious disregard of a court order is a prerequisite for impo-
sition of the more severe sanctions of Rule 37. Nonetheless, the court
seized upon the language in Societe Internationale to support its hold-
ing that gross negligence may properly be "embraced within the 'fault'
component of Societe Internationale's triple criterion. '59
In contrast to those courts that adhere to the conventional intent
threshold, the courts following the gross negligence culpability thresh-
old place greater importance on the efficient administration of discov-
ery than on reaching the merits of a dispute.60 The Affanato and Cine
courts emphasized the purpose and value of the Rule 37 sanctions as a
means of protecting other litigants, as well as the resources of the
judicial system, 61 while maintaining fidelity to the demands of due
process.
55. Id. at 141. The noncompliance in this case arose out of an unusual set of
circumstances. The original attorney in charge of the defendant's case left his law firm
in Massachusetts and moved to Maine. The firm allowed him to continue to handle
the case. Over a period of years, the lawyer ignored repeated discovery orders.
Though it was argued that the firm had every reason to trust the attorney and that the
firm had no knowledge of his noncompliance, the court found the decisive fact to be
that the conduct of counsel, with which the defendant was chargeable, amounted to
"near total dereliction of professional responsibility." Id.
56. Id. at 140 (quoting Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling
Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972)).
57. 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979).
58. See, e.g., Note, Emerging Deterrence, supra note 46, at 1043; see also 4A J.
MOORE, J. LUCAS, & D. EPSTEIN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 37.03[2.-5] (2d
ed. 1984).
59. Cine, 602 F.2d at 1067.
60. See Note, supra note 45, at 147.
61. See generally Cine, 602 F.2d at 1068 (courts should not shrink from imposing
harsh sanctions when warranted "in this day of burgeoning, costly and protracted
litigation"); Affanato, 547 F.2d at 140 (time and energies of courts should be consid-
ered in selecting a sanction).
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The third threshold, that of ordinary negligence, has yet to be
adopted by any court. Proposals for an ordinary negligence standard
are based on the view that "[s]ince a finding of negligent failure to
comply with a discovery order presupposes 'fault,' the ordinary negli-
gence threshold would comport with Societe Internationale's
mandated minimum culpability standards. ' 62 It is argued that an or-
dinary negligence standard would be consistent with, and serve the
purposes of, the deterence rationale advanced by National Hockey
League and perhaps would be more workable than a gross negligence
threshold.63
III. THE ALASKA INTERPRETATION OF RULE 37
There are few Alaska cases which discuss the use of discovery
sanctions. The cases that have considered the grounds for the imposi-
tion of litigation-ending sanctions do not provide a clear understand-
ing of the Alaska Supreme Court's position on discovery sanctions.
Specifically, the cases raise questions concerning the culpability
requirement.
A. The Role of Willfulness
The positions the Alaska courts have taken on the use of discov-
ery sanctions have been based on federal court interpretations of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 37.64 In its first consideration of Rule 37,
the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that its interpretation of Civil
Rule 37(b)(2)[c] 65 would follow that of the rule's model, Federal Rule
37, as set forth in Societe Internationale. 66 In Oaks v. Rojcewicz, the
court reversed a dismissal with prejudice, holding that Rule 37 should
be construed to authorize dismissals of claims only when it is estab-
lished that a party's failure to comply with a production order is will-
ful. In this decision, the court reviewed the prevailing federal practice
62. Note, supra note 45, at 148.
63. Id. at 148-49. The author suggests that the ordinary negligence threshold is a
logical extension of the Societe Internationale and the National Hockey League deci-
sions, and that because the distinction between gross and ordinary negligence is often
blurred, the ordinary negligence threshold should ultimately be adopted. Id. at 156-
57.
64. See, e.g., Hawes Firearms Co. v. Edwards, 634 P.2d 377, 378 (Alaska 1981);
Oaks v. Rojcewicz, 409 P.2d 839, 843 (Alaska 1966). It should be noted that while
the Alaska courts are bound by the constitutional limitations on the imposition of
litigation-ending sanctions as expressed by the federal courts, they need not necessar-
ily adhere to rule interpretations as set forth in the federal system. The assumption in
this note is that the Alaska courts intend to follow federal precedent as a general
guide.
65. Predecessor to the current ALASKA R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
66. Oaks v. Rojcewicz, 409 P.2d 839, 843 (Alaska 1966).
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and recognized that the more severe sanctions, such as dismissal with
prejudice, should be imposed only for flagrant abuses of discovery pro-
cedure. 67 The Oaks court, however, did not state that willfulness is
required for all Rule 37 sanctions.
Despite the Alaska court's professed adherence in Oaks to the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 37, subsequent
Alaska decisions occasionally reveal an uneasiness with some of the
basic principles that have been propounded by the Supreme Court.
Specifically, some opinions manifest a misunderstanding of the proper
role of willfulness in the sanctioning process.68 This misunderstand-
ing, which may simply be a result of an imprecise articulation of the
court's reasoning, has been evident in cases in which it has not been
the determinative factor. Such incongruencies, however, deserve com-
ment. Because the use of litigation-ending sanctions generates rela-
tively few judicial opinions, the possibility that a careless statement
will lead to a misapplication of the law is too great to be left
unaddressed.
In Hart v. Wolff 6 9 the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a dismis-
sal resulting from a refusal to comply with an order to produce re-
quested documents. Citing the Oaks decision, the court stated that "it
should be noted that application of Rule 37 sanctions against a party
who has failed to make discovery is not proper unless the court finds
that there has been a 'willful refusal on the part of a party ordered to
make discovery.' "70 Although the requirement of willfulness for the
imposition of the dismissal sanction was recognized in Oaks, the Oaks
opinion does not support the overreaching proposition set forth in
Hart. Not all Rule 37 sanctions require willfulness, as other Alaska
decisions readily acknowledge. 71 Although the Hart case did involve
the question whether an action was properly dismissed 72 - an issue
dependent on a finding of willfulness - the court's language was not
so limited. Rather, the opinion suggests that willfulness is a require-
ment for the imposition of the least, as well as the most, drastic
sanctions.
Similar implications arise from the court's opinion in Hawes Fire-
arms Co. v. Edwards. 73 Hawes involved an appeal from an order strik-
ing all of the appellant's defenses and limiting the trial to the question
67. Id. at 844.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 69-80.
69. 489 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1971).
70. Id. at 118 (emphasis in original) (quoting Oaks v. Rojcewicz, 409 P.2d 839,
840 (Alaska 1966)).
71. See, e.g., State v. Guinn 555 P.2d 530, 543 (Alaska 1976); Ketchikan Cold
Storage Co. v. State, 491 P.2d 143, 148 (Alaska 1971).
72. Hart, 489 P.2d at 115.
73. 634 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1981).
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of damages. For all practical purposes, this order was a litigation-
ending sanction.74 As the court correctly recognized, the severity of
the sanction required a showing of willfulness before the sanction
could be imposed. In describing the operation of Rule 37(b), however,
the court stated that "[w]illfulness, in the sense of a conscious intent to
impede discovery, and not mere delay, inability or good faith resist-
ance, must be demonstrated before sanctions may be imposed."' 75 As
in Hart, the court's language is too broad because it states that willful-
ness must be present before a court may impose any of the Rule 37(b)
sanctions.
The unqualified language of the Hawes opinion appears to have
had a small, but potentially significant, impact on the court's later in-
terpretation of the rule. Under Rule 37(c), a less severe sanction -
the assessment of expenses - is available when a party fails to admit
the truth of a matter requested under Rule 36 that is subsequently
proved. 76 In Riley v. Northern Commercial Co.,77 Rule 37 was in-
volved only because the petitioner requested that Rule 37(c) sanctions
be imposed rather than have certain responses deemed admitted pur-
suant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 36. The court, relying on
Hawes, noted that sanctions imposed pursuant to Rule 37(c) were only
appropriate where a party willfully intends to impede the discovery
process.78 The Hawes opinion, however, did not involve a Rule 37(c)
motion, nor did it address the requirements of that subsection. Thus,
the Riley court seemingly relied on the sweeping statement in Hawes
that a finding of willfulness is necessary for the imposition of all Rule
37 sanctions.
In Pew v. Foster,79 the court again quoted with approval the
Hawes statement that willfulness must be demonstrated before any
Rule 37 sanctions are imposed. Although the case only indirectly con-
cerned a default judgment under Rule 37, Pew is further evidence of
the court's inattentiveness to the appropriate application of the rule.
The Hawes statement, albeit confined to a footnote and correct in its
application to the Pew case,80 should be restricted to litigation-ending
74. The sanction of the striking of defenses amounted to a finding that the defend-
ant manufacturer's handgun was defective. The trial was then to proceed to the ques-
tion of damages against the defendant. Id. at 378.
75. Id.
76. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 37(c).
77. 648 P.2d 961 (Alaska 1982).
78. Id. at 964 n.4.
79. 660 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1983).
80. The court in Pew was concerned with a default judgment. To the extent that
it recognized that willfulness is required for the sanction of default, the court was
correct. Id. at 449 n.3.
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sanctions. Such general statements present the danger that subsequent
Alaska opinions are likely to draw upon them to interpret Rule 37.
Not every Alaska Supreme Court decision after Oaks has articu-
lated willfulness as a requirement for the imposition of all Rule 37(b)
sanctions. Some decisions have declined to adopt the unqualified will-
fulness requirement and have followed the Oaks decision by limiting
the willfulness requirement to litigation-ending sanctions. For
example, in Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State, 81 the court refused to
sustain an establishment-preclusion order, noting that sanctions which
prevent a full adjudication on the merits should be imposed only upon
the clearest showing that such a sanction is necessary.82 The court
found that the record did not reveal willful noncompliance with the
lower court's production order, and it reversed the establishment-pre-
clusion order. In so holding, the court revealed that it understood the
true extent of the willfulness requirement:
Although Rule 37 does not in terms require a showing of willfulness
before any of its sanctions come into play, we will not sustain an
establishment-preclusion order relating to a central issue in a case
absent a showing of a willful failure to comply. In Oaks ... we
held that a showing of wilfulness was a prerequisite to a dismissal as
a sanction under Civil Rule 37(b)(2)(c). 83
Despite the absence of willful conduct in Ketchikan, the Alaska
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's assessment of the appellee's
costs in seeking enforcement of the discovery order. The court recog-
nized the power of the court under Rule 37(b) to enter "such orders in
regard to the refusal as are just"8 4 and found that the appellant's con-
duct, while not willful for purposes of imposing litigation-ending sanc-
tions, justified the imposition of less severe sanctions.85 The Ketchikan
opinion sets forth the proper mode of analysis for Rule 37(b) sanc-
tions. Willfulness is not a necessary condition for imposition of all
Rule 37 sanctions.86 Rather, willfulness is an additional requirement
for sanctions that terminate litigation without a full adjudication on
the merits. 87 If willfulness is absent, the effect on the application of
81. 491 P.2d 143 (Alaska 1971).
82. Id. at 147. As the court noted, the establishment-preclusion order imposed in
Ketchikan had a direct bearing on the critical issue determined by the jury. Id.
83. Id. at 148.
84. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 37(b) (1973). The current language of the rule reads in
terms of "failure" rather than "refusal."
85. 491 P.2d at 149. Specifically, the court cited the costly tardiness and lack of
cooperation with the discovery process on the part of the appellant as behavior which
merited the assessment of the costs of discovery.
86. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 208.
87. As is made clear in the Ketchikan decision, in cases involving establishment-
preclusion orders, the termination without a full adjudication must relate to a central
issue in the case. See generally State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, 543 (Alaska 1976)
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Rule 37(b) is twofold. First, the use of non-litigation-ending sanctions
under Rule 37(b) is still available, despite suggestions to the contrary.
Second, a court may not impose the more severe sanctions authorized
by the rule.
Subsequent Alaska decisions also have recognized that willfulness
is not required for the imposition of all sanctions under Rule 37(b). In
Continental Insurance Cos. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc.,88 the court
noted that before litigation-ending sanctions may be imposed pursuant
to Rule 37(b)(2), a party must have willfully disobeyed an order com-
pelling discovery.8 9 The extension of the willfulness requirement to
less severe sanctions was not mentioned. In State v. Guinn,90 the trial
court received testimony predicated on an accident report which was
based largely on a missing notebook. The state had failed to comply
with an order compelling production of the notebook. After it was
established at trial that the state had not made reasonable efforts to
locate the notebook before trial, the court invoked Rule 37(b) to strike
the testimony based on the notebook. Noting that the state's failure to
produce the notebook did not constitute bad faith or purposeful decep-
tion, the court held that the sanction selected under Rule 37 was not
so drastic as to require willfulness. 91
These three cases, Ketchikan, Continental, and Guinn, reveal that
the unqualified requirement of willfulness which has been read into
Rule 37 by several Alaska Supreme Court opinions is not always in-
voked by the court. Moreover, even those cases that contain the
sweeping language concerning the willfulness requirement were cor-
rectly decided on their facts.92 Nevertheless, the overreaching lan-
guage in some opinions is clearly contrary to the prevailing view in the
federal courts.93 The inconsistent approach can only serve to confuse
litigants concerned about the imposition of sanctions in the Alaska
court system. The Alaska Supreme Court should take note of the po-
tential confusion its imprecision invites and.articulate which sanctions
require willful noncompliance and which do not.
(though precluded from making use of certain testimony, the sanctioned party re-
mained free to establish its contention by any other means available).
88. 548 P.2d 398 (Alaska 1976).
89. Id. at 404.
90. 555 P.2d at 530.
91. Id. at 543.
92. It will be recalled that the Hart and Hawes cases, although the opinions over-
extended the willfulness requirement, did involve sanctions that required an enhanced
level of culpability.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. See also Societe Internationale, 357
U.S. at 208 (once a party fails to comply with a discovery order, Rule 37(b)(2) may be
invoked; willfulness is relevant only to the choice of sanction).
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B. The Burden of Showing Culpability
Rule 37 does not expressly state which party should bear the bur-
den of proving or disproving culpability for failure to comply with
discovery orders. Both the Alaska and the federal courts have been
rather hesitant to address this issue and generally do not put the bur-
den on either party. Instead, the courts prefer to analyze the issue on
the basis of the evidence in the record.94 The failure of most courts to
discuss the allocation of burdens in discovery sanction cases may re-
flect the belief that a formal allocation is simply unnecessary. 95
Once a failure to comply with a discovery order occurs and sanc-
tions are sought, the party seeking discovery will present evidence that
demonstrates culpable conduct on the part of the noncomplying party.
The emphasis will be on behavior that smacks of bad faith or inten-
tional non-cooperation. To refute these contentions, the party from
whom discovery is sought will introduce evidence which militates
against such a finding and emphasizes the innocent nature of the non-
compliance. The resolution of these conflicting contentions rests in
the discretion of the trial court. Deciding whether the circumstances
reveal conduct sufficiently culpable to warrant the imposition of a liti-
gation-ending sanction need not entail explicit consideration of the
meeting of burdens. The court simply can review the record to deter-
mine whether sufficient culpability is exhibited without expressly con-
sidering the burden of proof issue.
The discussion of the burden of proof in two recent Alaska
Supreme Court cases illustrates the significance of the allocation of
burdens. In these cases the court approached the burden issue from
two different perspectives. In Hawes Firearms Co. v. Edwards,96 the
Alaska Supreme Court noted that although the trial court did not spe-
cifically consider willfulness, it did find that certain information was
withheld from discovery without justification. Given the noncomply-
ing party's inability to justify his failure to comply with the discovery
order, the trial court struck his defenses and tried the case as to dam-
ages only. The supreme court approved the effect of the trial court's
reasoning, because it placed the burden of refuting willfulness on the
party from whom discovery was sought.97 A requirement that the
noncomplying party show that its action was not willful is significant
because it sets up a presumption of willfulness. This presumption
94. See, e.g., Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1126-27 (5th Cir.
1970).
95. The nature of the issue, whether and to what degree a party is at fault for
failing to comply with the court's order, and the fact that the decision rests within the
discretion of the court, arguably render a discussion of burdens unnecessary.
96. 634 P.2d 377, 378 (Alaska 1981).
97. Id. at 378 n.2.
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becomes important in cases in which culpable conduct is not manifest
in the record, but no justification exists for the noncompliance. 98
In contrast to the burden analysis in Hawes, the Alaska Supreme
Court appeared to place a burden of showing willfulness on the discov-
ering party in Ketchikan Cold Storage Co. v. State. 99 Noting that the
only evidence of willful nondisclosure was the noncomplying party's
delay in making discovery and the unsubstantiated allegations of the
opposing counsel, the court reversed an establishment-preclusion
order because the record did not show willfulness. 10° The emphasis on
a showing of willful nondisclosure in Ketchikan suggests that it is in-
cumbent upon the discovering party to produce evidence that reveals
the requisite level of culpability. Had the burden in Ketchikan been
imposed on the noncomplying party, the court's analysis would have
focused on the question whether the record or the noncompliant
showed an absence of willfulness.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF LITIGATION-ENDING
SANCTIONS
A. Create a Rebuttable Presumption of Willfulness
The Alaska courts should clarify which party bears the burden of
proving culpability, or its absence, in Rule 37(b) litigation-ending
sanction cases. This burden should be placed on the party that has
failed to comply with the court's discovery order. Upon a failure to
comply with a request for sanctions, the court should require the non-
complying party to demonstrate that his failure was not sufficiently
culpable to warrant a litigation-ending sanction. In other words, the
noncompliance should be presumed to be culpable unless the delin-
quent party shows that his failure was not due to willfulness, bad faith,
or any fault of his own.
United States Supreme Court precedent supports imposing this
burden on the noncomplying party. As previously discussed, the
Court held in Societe Internationale01 that Rule 37 should not be con-
strued to authorize dismissal when it has been established that the
98. In Hart v. Wolff, 489 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1971), the supreme court found sup-
port in the record that a discovery order had been willfully disobeyed. This support
consisted of, inter alia, the facts that the noncomplying party did not have a satisfac-
tory explanation as to why certain records were not produced and admitted to having
made no efforts to produce the records. Though a burden was not expressly imposed
on the noncomplying party, the implication is that a failure to justify noncompliance
may be sufficient for a finding of willfulness. Id. at 118.
99. 491 P.2d at 143.
100. Id. at 148.
101. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Comerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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nondisclosure is the result of an inability to comply. 10 2 The language
the Court used to preclude the use of strict sanctions when an inability
to comply is shown suggests that the delinquent party bears the bur-
den of explanation, because the noncomplying party is in the best posi-
tion to show an inability to comply.' 0 3
The Alaska Supreme Court in Hawes Firearms Co. v. Edwards10 4
has also recognized the logic of this approach. As noted, the Hawes
court approved the imposition of a burden of showing that noncompli-
ance was not culpable. In most instances, only the noncomplying
party knows the precise reason for its failure to comply. It would be
unreasonable to impose the burden of explaining that party's noncom-
pliance on the party seeking discovery. "If that were the requirement,
then the moving party would have a limitless number of questions to
answer, for there are an infinite number of possible reasons why one
may not have answered, most of them dependent upon the facts not at
all within the ken of one's opponent."' 05
Placing the burden of showing nonculpability on the noncomply-
ing party is also in accord with Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas.10 6
In Hammond, the Court approved of a presumption which treated the
failure to produce evidence as an admission of a lack of merit in the
asserted defense. Though the Court in Societe Internationale recog-
nized that the presumption utilized in Hammond might violate the
noncomplying party's due process rights if good faith inability to com-
ply were shown, placing the burden of showing that good faith inabil-
ity upon the noncomplying party would not create due process
problems. Indeed, the legitimacy of such an approach is implicit in
Hammond. 10 7
In addition to conforming to the Supreme Court's interpretation
102. See supra text accompanying note 41.
103. The Court cited "[t]he findings below, and what has been shown as to peti-
tioner's extensive efforts at compliance" as grounds for concluding that the noncom-
pliance was due to inability, hence not deserving of dismissal. 357 U.S. at 211.
Certainly, it was the noncomplying party who showed his extensive efforts at
compliance.
104. 634 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1981).
105. Id. at 378 n.2 (quoting Frates v. Treder, 249 Cal. App. 2d 199, 204, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 383, 387 (1967) (emphasis in original)).
106. 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
107. The Court in Hammond recognized that "all the statute required was a bona
fide effort to comply with an order made pursuant to its provisions, and therefore any
reasonable showing of an inability to comply would have satisfied the requirements
both of the statute and the order." Id. at 347. In Societe Internationale, the Court
indicated that the presumption utilized in Hammond might violate due process if it
were imposed because of a party's inability, despite good-faith efforts, to comply with
a discovery order. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 210. The suggestion here would
preserve a party's due process rights; a litigation-ending sanction would be imposed
only if the delinquent party failed to adequately explain its noncompliance.
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of Rule 37, the requirement that the noncomplying party demonstrate
that its behavior was not sufficiently culpable to permit litigation-
ending sanctions is consistent with other discovery procedures. For
instance, before a sanction may be imposed under Rule 37(b), there
must be a failure to comply with a court order to permit or provide
further discovery. Because the party from whom discovery was
sought will have had an opportunity to comply with the court order, it
is only reasonable to require that party to explain its failure to comply.
In sum, a party that is responsible for impeding the discovery process
should bear the responsibility of justifying its own delinquency.
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 34 also support a require-
ment that an adequate explanation be given for noncompliance. The
availability of a protective order under Rule 26(c) "for good cause
shown"108 is evidence of the policy of requiring those parties seeking
to avoid discovery to justify their actions. While the courts have the
authority to issue protective orders precluding discovery in some in-
stances, the party seeking protection must first explain why discovery
should not be allowed.10 9 Similarly, Rule 34 permits objection to a
discovering party's request for production, but requires the objecting
party to state the basis for his objection. 110
B. Adopt a Diminished Culpability Standard
The Alaska courts should clarify the role of culpability under
Rule 37. At the very least, the courts should align themselves with the
majority position which only requires greater culpability when the
sanction sought would effectively terminate the litigation. Despite lan-
guage to the contrary in some opinions,"' it seems clear that the
Alaska Supreme Court does not intend to extend the enhanced culpa-
bility requirement to all the sanctions permitted by Rule 37. A posi-
tion extending that requirement to all sanctions would not only be
contrary to the interpretation of Federal Rule 37, but would be diffi-
cult to defend given the design and variety of sanctions permitted by
the rule.
The Alaska courts should also review the degree of culpability
necessary for the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions. As the pre-
ceding analysis suggests, the court can adopt distinct positions on the
level of culpability that warrants imposition of more serious sanctions.
The prevailing position, based on the Supreme Court's holdings in
108. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(c).
109. See 4A J. MOORE, J. LucAs & D. EpSTEIN, supra note 58, at 26.68.
110. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 34(b). See generally Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976) (Under Rule 34, a party from whom discovery is
sought has the burden of showing the reason why discovery should not be allowed.).
111. See, e.g., Hawes, 634 P.2d at 378.
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Societe Internationale and National Hockey League, requires that the
failure to comply be due not to inability, but to "willfulness, bad faith,
or any fault of [the noncomplying party]."1 12 Thus, the noncomplying
party must be guilty of some intentional action or omission in the fail-
ure to obey the discovery order before litigation-ending sanctions may
be imposed. An alternative position, that identified as the gross negli-
gence threshold, 113 should be considered by the Alaska courts. Under
this standard, behavior need not rise to a level which exhibits intention
or willfulness; rather, grossly negligent conduct is sufficient to warrant
the imposition of the harshest sanctions.1 14
There are three reasons for adopting this alternative position.
First, despite its current lack of recognition, the gross negligence stan-
dard is consistent with the Court's reasoning in Societe Internationale.
As noted by the court in Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre v. Allied
Artists Pictures Corp., 115 the Societe Internationale Court's choice of
the term "fault" in its discussion of Rule 37(b) must be recognized as
deliberate and meaningful. "[I]f 'fault' has any meaning not subsumed
by 'willfulness' and 'bad faith,' it must at least cover gross negligence
of the type present in this case."' 16 The Societe Internationale opinion
made clear that dismissal is not appropriate when the failure to com-
ply with a discovery order is due to a party's inability to comply. The
gross negligence standard would be consistent with Societe Internatio-
nale because it would not impose sanctions when the failure to comply
is due to the party's inability to do so.
Second, the effect that the gross negligence threshold would have
on the administration of justice supports adopting the approach. By
giving the courts the power to terminate those cases that unnecessarily
prolong and needlessly frustrate the judicial process, the diminished
culpability requirement would enhance the courts' power to further
the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every action and pro-
ceeding. Because grossly negligent conduct is as capable of producing
unnecessary delay and expense as willful noncompliance, the full
range of Rule 37 sanctions should be available to address such
behavior. 117
The deterrent function of sanctions is the third consideration sup-
porting adoption of the gross negligence standard in Alaska. The
112. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 212.
113. See Note, supra note 45, at 145-47; see supra text accompanying notes 54-61.
114. Gross negligence is defined as "[indifference to present legal duty and utter
forgetfulness of legal obligations, so far as other persons may be affected, and a mani-
festly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection that the circumstances re-
quire of a person or ordinary prudence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (5th ed.
1979).
115. 602 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1979).
116. Id.
117. The emphasis here is on making the sanctions available but by no means
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United States Supreme Court's opinion in National Hockey League v.
Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc. unequivocally approved of the propo-
sition that deterrence was a legitimate function of Rule 37.118 While
most observers consider intentional behavior to be the most suscepti-
ble to deterrence,119 negligent conduct is also considered capable of
being deterred.1 20 The adoption of a standard that permits courts to
treat grossly negligent noncompliance as they do intentional noncom-
pliance comports with the shift in National Hockey League to a more
deterrence-oriented approach.
The importance of reaching the merits of each dispute, however,
should not be underestimated or overwhelmed by concerns of effi-
ciency. The reluctance of courts to impose litigation-ending sanctions,
even in cases of intentional abuse of discovery, has traditionally been
based on due process concerns. The cases from which the diminished
culpability standard has developed have been mindful of the due pro-
cess limitations on the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions.
V. CONCLUSION
A reduced culpability threshold, coupled with the imposition of a
burden upon the noncomplying party to show that this threshold was
not reached, would result in better discovery performance. These
changes would sharpen the awareness levels of those parties involved
in litigation with respect to their responsibilities to the court and to
their opponents. Moreover, if the responsibilities of the parties in the
discovery process, particularly those of noncomplying parties, are
more clearly articulated and emphasized, the amount of noncompli-
ance is likely to diminish.
Robert Carroll
mandatory. The choice of sanctions is at all times within the discretion of the the trial
court.
118. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
119. See Note, supra note 45, at 151.
120. See G. CALABREsI, THE COsTS OF ACCIDENTS 133-73 (1970).
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